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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reinhard Siekaczek, a skeptical former accountant of Sie-
mens A.G., expressed little optimism that Siemens’ violations 
of German law and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s 
(“FCPA”)1 prohibitions against bribing foreign officials would 
deter others in a world full of corruption.  Siekaczek states, 
“[p]eople will only say about Siemens that they were unlucky 
and that they broke the 11th commandment. The 11th com-
mandment is: ‘Don’t get caught.’”2  At Siemens, Siekaczek par-
ticipated in large-scale bribery by helping maintain a budget of 
tens of millions of dollars per year that was dedicated to brib-
ing foreign officials, what one bureaucrat described as the 
“Siemens’ business model” and “institutionalized corruption.”3  
Eventually, Siemens and many of its subsidiaries paid a heavy 
price for getting caught: over $2.6 billion spent in fees, fines to 
the U.S. and Germany, and corporate reform measures to re-
place corruption with compliance.4 
While many American businesspeople and companies who 
understand the realities of doing business in foreign countries 
would likely agree with Siekaczek’s lamentation, the problem 
with the 11th commandment is that “not getting caught” for 
bribery is becoming increasingly difficult in the U.S.  This is so 
not only because of the FCPA prevents the making of “corrupt 
payments” to foreign officials for the purpose of promoting 
business interests, but because the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) is strictly enforcing the FCPA by investigating more 
                                                        
1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2010); see also 
Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Antibribery Provisions (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Lay-Person’s 
Guide to the FCPA]  
2 T. Christian Miller & Siri Schubert, At Siemens, Bribery was Just a 
Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
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cases,5 levying extremely high fines in plea bargains,6 and even 
performing sting operations through the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.7  
Avoiding notice is likely hard enough in a situation where 
only one individual is paying bribes, but bribery naturally be-
comes harder to conceal when multiple parties are involved.  
Such is the case in the world of international project finance.8  
Because the FCPA’s reach is not restricted to the people who 
physically pay the money or make an improper offer, liability 
can extend much further than U.S. companies and business-
people might expect and hope.  Consequently, complicated is-
sues of liability exist for many project finance participants be-
cause any one project can include many people and entities—
lenders, agents, project sponsors, project companies, construc-
tors, operators, and so forth.  Thus, rather than hoping to “not 
get caught,” project finance participants should take active 
steps throughout the duration of a project to identify potential 
violations and prevent bribes.  This strategy presents partici-
pants with the best opportunity for avoiding FCPA liability, 
possible jail time, and severe economic and other consequences 
to the project.9 
                                                        
5 Shearman & Sterling LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA En-
forcement, in CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE 
ON THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, at A-8 (2008). 
6 Steven A. Tyrrell, DOJ Prosecution of BAE Heralds Continued Aggres-
sive FCPA Enforcement Environment, WEIL (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.weil. 
com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9725 (stating that Siemens paid a criminal 
penalty of $450 million). 
7 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees 
of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign 
Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010). 
8 Catherine Pedamon, How is Convergence Best Achieved in International 
Project Finance?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1272, 1273 (2001) (describing project 
finance as “a debt technique used for the development of a public infrastruc-
ture project . . . where lenders look primarily to the cash flow produced by the 
project to service their debt.”). 
9 While much has been written about both the FCPA and international 
project finance, not much exists about the two together. This study attempts 
to fill that void. While FCPA has anti-bribery and accounting provisions, this 
work will only focus on the anti-bribery provisions. Finally, this paper will 
first expound upon the FCPA, then summarize key aspects of project finance, 
and conclude by looking at many FCPA problems and solutions in project fi-
nance. 
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II. FCPA STATUTE AND EXPLANATION 
A. Liable Parties  
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA apply to various 
parties that utilize project finance to carry out foreign endeav-
ors and projects.  First, the FCPA applies to any issuer of “se-
curities that have been registered in the United States or who 
is required to file periodic reports with the SEC,”10 as well as to 
“any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any 
stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer.”11  Second, 
“domestic concerns” are subject to the FCPA.12  A “domestic 
concern” is a U.S. citizen, resident, national, or “any corpora-
tion, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business 
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship” that 
has the U.S. as its primary place of business or that is orga-
nized under any U.S. state or territory law.13  Domestic con-
cerns can also be liable where they worked or acted for foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.14  Third, “any person” who is 
not an issuer or a domestic concern, or “any officer, director, 
employee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof 
acting on behalf of such person” who takes a step toward violat-
ing the FCPA in the U.S., is liable.15  Any “person” means “any 
natural person other than a [U.S.] national . . . or any corpora-
tion, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business 
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship” not 
organized under any law of the U.S.16  
The FCPA also applies to any of these parties that give or 
promise something of value to a person while knowing that 
some or all of the item will be used to violate the FCPA.17  The 
giving party is deemed to have knowledge when the giving par-
ty is aware that the other party is “engaging in such conduct, 
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substan-
                                                        
10 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3. 
11 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2010). 
12 § 78dd-2(a). 
13 § 78dd-2(h)(1)(b). 
14 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3. 
15 § 78dd-3(a). 
16 §§ 78dd-1a3, 2a3, 3a3. 
17 Id. 
2012]  WHEN “NOT GETTING CAUGHT” IS NOT ENOUGH 115 
tially certain to occur.”18  Alternatively, knowledge exists when 
a party has “a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that 
such result is substantially certain to occur”19 and there is a 
“high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless 
the person actually believes that such circumstance does not 
exist.”20  This standard prevents directors from escaping liabil-
ity when they did nothing in the face of red flags.21  Actions of 
agents and consultants,22 as well as subsidiaries,23 can place li-
ability on an issuer, domestic concern, or “any person” if these 
latter actors had knowledge.  
B. Prohibited Actions   
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit these actors 
from using “the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, 
promise to pay, authorization of the payment of any money, of-
fer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of any-
thing of value” to any foreign official, political party, official of 
a political party, political party candidate, or anyone who the 
actor knows will commit one of these forbidden acts with the 
purpose of “obtaining or retaining business” with anyone.24  A 
failed offer or promise is enough for liability.25  Obtaining and 
retaining business is done by:  
influencing any act or decision of [the foreign person]; inducing 
such [official] to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful 
duty of [the person]; securing any improper advantage; or induc-
ing [the person] to use his or its influence with a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or 
decision of that person.26  
                                                        
18 §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i), 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)(i), 78dd-3(f)(3)(A)(i). 
19 §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(ii), 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)(ii), 78dd-3(f)(3)(A)(ii). 
20 §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(B), 78dd-3(f)(3)(B). 
21 See, e.g., David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 671, 682-83 (2009). 
22 ROBERT W. TARUN, BASICS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
WHAT EVERY GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYER AND WHITE COLLAR 
CRIMINAL LAWYER SHOULD KNOW 26 (2006). 
23 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3. 
24 §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a). 
25 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3. 
26 §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a). 
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Various elements of these prohibited actions, when de-
fined, show how far liability can reach.  First, interstate com-
merce is defined as “trade, commerce, transportation, or com-
munication among the several States; or between any foreign 
country and any State; or between any State and any place or 
ship outside thereof,” which includes communicating between 
these places through a telephone or other medium.27  There-
fore, an airline flight between states, or between the U.S. and 
other countries,28 as well as a wire transfer,29 a fax,30 an 
email,31 or a letter,32 could be enough to engage the FCPA.   
Furthermore, issuers and domestic concerns can be liable for 
FCPA violations anywhere in the world.33  If issuers or domes-
tic concerns use any means of interstate commerce to bring 
about a corrupt payment, the U.S. has territorial jurisdiction.34  
If, however, they take any action in the furtherance of a cor-
rupt payment outside the U.S., no use of interstate commerce is 
necessary35 because the U.S. can maintain jurisdiction based 
on nationality.36  For persons that are not issuers or domestic 
concerns, jurisdiction and liability depend on whether any ac-
tion took place within the U.S.37  
Offering help on the meaning of “corruptly,” the Eighth 
Circuit approved a jury instruction defining “corruptly” as pro-
hibited action that is “intended to induce the recipient to mis-
use his official position or to influence someone else to do so,” 
and is “done voluntarily and intentionally and with a bad pur-
pose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a 
lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.”38  
                                                        
27 §§ 78dd-2(h)(5)(A), 3(f)(5)(A). 
28 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3. 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 
(D. Or. 2001), aff'd, 348 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003). 
31 See, e.g., MAYER BROWN LLP, A POCKET GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2009). 
32 §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a). 
33 §§ 78dd-1(g)(1), 2(i)(1). 
34 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3. 
35 §§ 78dd-1(g)(1), 2(i)(1). 
36 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3.  
37 Peter W. Schroth, The United States and International Bribery Con-
ventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 602 (2002). 
38 United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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Third, a foreign official is “any officer or employee of a for-
eign government or any department, agency, or instrumentali-
ty thereof, or of a public international organization, or any per-
son acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of” any of 
those listed parties.39  This definition can become quite compli-
cated in situations where joint private and public ownership 
exists and in certain industries, such as defense contracting, 
where a government’s stake is not apparent on the surface.40  
An employee of a foreign firm might be a foreign official if the 
government appoints him or her, such as military personnel 
appointed to work for a defense contractor, or if the firm can be 
considered an “instrumentality” of the government.41  It is clear 
that employees of an enterprise completely owned by a gov-
ernment can be a foreign official.42  Additionally, the DOJ has 
emphasized that the official’s position—whether high or low 
ranking—does not matter.43   
Fourth, obtaining or retaining business means more than 
acquiring a contract or having one renewed.44  For instance, in 
United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit broadly construed the 
FCPA’s “obtaining or retaining business” requirement to in-
clude American businessmen who bribed to Haitian customs 
officials in order to receive discounted duties and sales taxes on 
their rice imports.45  The Court of Appeals remanded the case 
to the district court to decide if the bribes were “designed to in-
duce foreign officials unlawfully to perform their official duties 
in administering the laws and regulations of their country to 
produce a result intended to assist in obtaining or retaining 
business in that country.”46  Thus, it seems that many actions 
could fall under the statute as long as there is sufficient con-
                                                        
39 §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 2(h)(2)(A), 3(f)(2)(A). 
40 See Sharie A. Brown & Brian S. Chilton, Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 11 BRIEFLY, no. 5, 2007 at iii, 10-11. 
41 Id. at 11. 
42 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Executives of 
Itxc Corp Plead Guilty and Former Regional Director Sentenced in Foreign 
Bribery Scheme (July 27, 2007). 
43 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that “[t]he 
FCPA applies to payments to any public official, regardless of rank or posi-
tion”). 
44 Id. at 4.  
45 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
46 Id. at 761. 
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nection between the action and an intention to obtain or retain 
business.  Further, the business sought need not be with the 
government; it can be with any person.47  
C. Exceptions 
The anti-bribery provisions do allow a few exceptions.  One 
can pay a foreign official for “routine governmental actions.”48  
Routine governmental actions are services “ordinarily and 
commonly performed” by foreign officials for: (1) obtaining 
permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a per-
son to do business in a foreign country; (2) processing govern-
mental papers, such as visas and work orders; (3) providing po-
lice protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling 
inspections associated with contract performance or inspections 
related to transit of goods across country; (4) providing phone 
service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, 
or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterio-
ration; and (5) similar actions.49  Such activities do not entail 
“acquiring or retaining business,” as used in the FCPA.50  A 
party can also make “a reasonable and bona fide expenditure” 
to a foreign official, which includes “travel and lodging expens-
es . . . directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or ex-
planation of products or services; or the execution or perfor-
mance of a contract with a foreign government or agency 
thereof.”51  Metcalf & Eddy Inc. gave an Egyptian official 150 
percent of his per diem in advance, paid the expenses that the 
per diem should have covered, paid for air travel for him and 
his family, and gave other gifts to sway his view, these pay-
ments did not meet the threshold.52 
Furthermore, a party can use the affirmative defense that 
                                                        
47 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 3(a). 
48 §§ 78dd-1(b), 2(b), 3(b). 
49 §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), (h)(4)(A), 3(f)(4)(A). 
50 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5. 
51 §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 2(c)(2), 3(c)(2). 
52 Matthew S. Queler et. al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in 
 PROSKAUER ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: 
MANAGING, RESOLVING, AND AVOIDING CROSS-BORDER BUSINESS OR 
REGULATORY DISPUTES (2007), available at http://www.proskauerguide.com 
/law_topics/27/I (citing United States v. Metcalf & Eddy Inc., C.A. No. 99CV-
12566-N6 (D. Mass. 1999). 
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the prohibited action is legal according to the “written laws and 
regulations” of the country targeted by the bribe.53  In deter-
mining whether the action is legal in the foreign country, one 
should look at the “payment, not the payer.”54  Thus, the payer 
of a bribe in Azerbaijan who was exonerated based on his claim 
that he was extorted could not use this defense that his actions 
were legal; regardless of his exoneration, the payment was still 
illegal in Azerbaijan.55  This defense is not often successful be-
cause “[t]here is . . . no country with laws or regulations that 
authorize or permit bribery of public officials.”56  
D. Enforcement and Penalties 
The DOJ can enforce the anti-bribery provisions through 
criminal punishment for any party.57  Criminal punishment 
can come in the form of a fine of up to $2 million for a domestic 
concern that is an organization or for “any person” when it re-
fers to a foreign organization or entity,58 or a fine of up to 
$100,000 for any individual.59  Under the Alternative Fines 
Act, the DOJ can pursue a fine of up to double the benefit that 
was sought by the bribe.60  Employers and principals cannot 
pay any fines levied against individuals.61  Also, individuals 
can be subject to imprisonment of up to five years.62  The DOJ 
and Securities Exchange Commission can also impose civil lia-
bility on any party for up to $10,000 and other fines of up to 
$500,000.63  The Attorney General has injunctive authority to 
prevent a violation from happening.64  
                                                        
53 §§ 7dd-1 to -3. 
54 United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
55 Id. at 539-41.  
56 Richard M. Strassberg & Kyle A. Wombolt, Beware Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Traps, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 2008, at n.2.  
57 See, e.g., Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5. 
58 §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), dd-3(e)(1)(A). 
59 §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), dd-3(e)(2)(A). 
60 See, e.g., Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5 
61 Id. 
62 §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), dd-3(e)(2)(A). 
63 Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA, supra note 1, at 5.  
64 §§ 78dd-2(d)(1), dd-3(d)(1). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE 
Project finance, though defined in many ways, usually re-
fers to  
a nonrecourse or limited recourse financing structure in which 
debt, equity, and credit enhancement are combined for the con-
struction and operation, or the refinancing, of a particular facility 
in a capital-intensive industry, in which lenders based credit ap-
praisals on the projected revenues from the operation of the facil-
ity, rather than the general assets or the credit of the sponsor of 
the facility, and rely on the assets of the facility, including any 
revenue-producing contracts and other cash flow generated by 
the facility, as collateral for the debt.65  
Project finance in the cross-border context is very complex 
and involves a large amount of participants and planning.  An 
essential party is the project sponsor, which comprises one or 
more companies or entities that will develop and seek the bene-
fit from the project.66  Before the project reaches its develop-
ment stage, the project sponsor will carry out a number of 
measures, including an extensive feasibility study of the tech-
nical and financial potential of the project67 and a development 
agreement with any other interested sponsors.68  If the project 
sponsor wishes to continue with the project, it will decide on 
the business vehicle that will carry out the project.69  The vehi-
cle, often a special-purpose vehicle created for the project (the 
“project company”),70 will participate in any required bidding 
processes in the host country.71  
The project company will need to acquire the various forms 
of government approval required for the project such as per-
mits and licenses,72 and negotiate contracts with the host gov-
                                                        
65 SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT 
FINANCE 4 (3d ed. 2008). Nonrecourse is where the project sponsor is com-
pletely free of debts or liabilities for the project, while the more frequently 
used limited recourse is where there are limited debts and obligations. Id. at 
5. 
66 Id. at 71. 
67 Id. at 84. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 85. 
70 Id. at 71. 
71 Id. at 37. 
72 See, e.g., ANDREW FIGHT, INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT FINANCE 11 (2006). 
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ernment.73  These contracts include, among others, concession 
agreements that bestow the right to carry out the project, 
build-own-transfer agreements under which the completed pro-
ject transfers to the host at some future time, arbitration 
agreements for resolving any dispute with the government, and 
an assurance that the government will not expropriate the pro-
ject.74  Many risks are present in all of these processes, which 
mean that parties must recognize and allocate risks to those 
who can best mitigate the risks’ potential impact on the pro-
ject.75 
Each project will likely have some combination of debt 
(created by a loan between one or more private or government 
institutions), collateral security (which can come as assign-
ments of revenue from the project or contractual rights), and 
equity.76  To acquire a loan, the borrowing entity—usually the 
project company—will usually contract its debt with a variety 
of lenders.77  Commercial lenders such as banks, international 
agencies such as the World Bank, bilateral agencies such as the 
U.S. Export-Import Bank, and bondholders who can buy debt 
in bond form are all lenders that can finance a project.78  The 
lender will make the loan based on the debtor’s credit ratings 
as reported by rating agencies.79  
Once funding is available, the project will require a num-
ber contracts to construct,80 supply,81 insure,82 or otherwise as-
sist the development, completion, and operation of the project.83  
These extensive negotiations are complex, primarily because 
“[e]ach participant brings into the project what other partici-
pants are lacking: financing ability, political authority, tech-
nical know-how, procurement of supplies, human resources, 
etc.,” and contracts are an effective method of allocating the 
                                                        
73 See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 37. 
74 Id. at 145–48. 
75 Id. at 27–28. 
76 Id. at 8. 
77 Id. at 71. 
78 Id. at 72–73. 
79 Id. at 73. 
80 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11. 
81 Id. 
82 HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 77. 
83 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11. 
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expertise and comparative advantage of each party.84  These 
contracts include many key agreements, including force 
majeure clauses with lenders and constructors for assurances 
in case of unforeseen disasters,85 cost overrun agreements to 
identify who will pay for excess costs,86 and covenants to ensure 
that the project is constructed and operated as planned.87 
Following this development stage, suppliers, output pur-
chasers, and contractors arrive, which necessitates more con-
tracts and guarantees.88  Risks increase during the construc-
tion phase because the project company is spending money 
while the project is not yet profitable.89  These risks can be 
eased through construction contracts and performance promis-
es.90  Similarly, contracts are key to the operation of the project 
when construction is over; agreements with the operator91 and 
others will handle unanticipated low revenues or political prob-
lems92 and control the flow of inputs necessary to the project’s 
operation, such as fuel.93 
IV. IDENTIFYING FCPA PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE 
Project finance parties must understand the FCPA and its 
implications for projects.  The host government is an absolutely 
necessary part of any project, which means that “project devel-
opment is particularly susceptible to temptations of bribery.”94  
Indeed, whenever a foreign official is involved with the project, 
the risk of a FCPA violation exists.  Furthermore, the number 
of parties means that there are more people that could violate 
the FCPA.  This liability can be deadly: “[i]n some instances, 
                                                        
84 Christophe Dugue, Dispute Resolution in International Project Finance 
Transactions, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1064, 1064 (2001). 
85 HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 184, 326. 
86 Id. at 350. 
87 Id. at 77. 
88 Id. at 73–74. 
89 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11. 
90 Id. 
91 HOFFMAN, supra note 67, at 74. The operator operates, maintains, and 
makes any repairs on the project. 
92 FIGHT, supra note 72, at 11. 
93 HOFFMAN, supra note 65, at 188–89. 
94 Id. at 397. 
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the constraints imposed by the FCPA may cause a US business 
to delay or restructure a project, seek a different business 
partner, decline work, or, in very rare circumstances, exit a ge-
ography.”95  Thus, parties must take many monitoring steps 
through a project to prevent violations of the law. 
A. Risk Assessment 
Throughout the life of a project, the parties will often as-
sess and attempt to mitigate whatever risks exist.96  A project 
will inevitably face many risks, such as risk of expropriation by 
the government of the country where the project occurs,97 risk 
of drop in demand of the finished project by the consumers in 
the project country,98 and risk of cost overruns.99  The risk 
structuring process is vital to a project, and is where “risks are 
identified, analyzed, quantified, mitigated, and allocated so 
that no individual risk threatens [any part of the project].”100  
This allocation can occur through contracts with those that are 
best able to prevent problems.101  
One risk that parties in a project should not overlook is the 
risk of an FCPA violation, which is present whenever a partici-
pant must work with foreign officials.  Any project requires a 
great deal of contact with the local government to acquire es-
sential licenses, permits, and agreements, any of which could 
involve an improper payment to facilitate the approval.102  A 
main problem for projects is that developing countries—
precisely where many opportunities exist due to the lack of in-
frastructure and need for projects—often have cultures where 
bribery is necessary to do business.103  Regardless of the host 
culture, any project that involves FCPA-liable parties is at risk 
of liability.  
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Therefore, assessment of FCPA risk in the host country is 
vital.  Using the risk structuring process,104 project participants 
should identify, analyze, quantify, mitigate, and allocate the 
risk of FCPA violations by looking at data, indices, or other in-
formation about corruption in the country where the project 
will occur.  Some suggest using Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index to perform this analysis.105  The 
Corruption Perceptions Index for 2009 lists among the most 
corrupt countries in the world, for example, multiple oil-rich 
countries where projects could or do occur: Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea, Angola, and Venezuela.106  This, or any other form of 
measurement, is an important aspect of assessing FCPA liabil-
ity risk in a project.  If a project sponsor knows that doing 
business in a country is impossible without bribing the officials, 
or if companies from countries where anti-bribery provisions do 
not exist will take advantage of the parties’ FCPA compli-
ance,107 the sponsor might see the bribery risk as too great to 
take on the project.  When the project begins, the risks of brib-
ery still exist.  As the risk structure analysis says, parties 
should allocate risks to those who are in the best position to 
handle it.108  A number of project participants can endanger the 
project through FCPA violations, which means that parties 
should allocate the risk of breaking this law to everyone in-
volved in order to protect the project. 
Not only is the risk of FCPA violations its own risk that 
project parties should consider, FCPA violations play im-
portant roles in other aspects of the risk structure process.  The 
stages of a project—development, design engineering and con-
struction, start-up, and operation—all have individual risks109 
that FCPA problems can exacerbate.  For example, in the de-
velopment phase, there is the risk that the government will not 
give necessary approvals.110  One might try to compensate for 
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the risk of failure with a bribe, which creates the risk of FCPA 
liability.  Throughout the project, parties must consider the 
risk that FCPA violation or compliance plays.  
B. Working with Local Agents, Partners, and Counsel 
To maneuver the regulations and laws of the host country 
and find local labor, business, and other necessary aspects to 
complete the project, it is “essential, as a matter of operational 
necessity” that the project enlist local agents.111  Local agents 
and consultants can provide vital help to projects because they 
can use expertise and contacts to connect with important gov-
ernment officials, push through paperwork for required gov-
ernment approvals, and help the project parties become famil-
iar with local businesses.112  Local attorneys are helpful 
because of their knowledge of the local law113 and can be very 
useful if they know important government officials.114  Some-
times host governments require that projects have at least one 
local ownership partner, which makes working with locals ob-
ligatory in those countries.115  
While their role is vital to a project, these local parties’ ac-
tions can create FCPA liability for themselves and other project 
parties.  The FCPA has jurisdiction over non-U.S. nationals 
and corporations or other business entities organized in a for-
eign country116 as long as at least some action made toward vio-
lating the FCPA using some form of interstate commerce takes 
place within U.S. territory.117  If the person negotiated a con-
tract with the U.S. project sponsor via email, phone conversa-
tions, or fax, the person is subject to the FCPA.118  Also, agents 
of issuers and domestic concerns are specifically subject to the 
FCPA.119  Furthermore, issuer or domestic concern project par-
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ties cannot offer, pay, promise a payment, or authorize a pay-
ment to any person who the issuer or domestic concern knows 
will use all or part of the money or item to commit a prohibited 
action with a foreign official.120  To establish corrupt intent for 
a third party’s actions, the DOJ can show an issuer’s or domes-
tic concern’s “willful blindness” of violation warning signs and 
purposeful avoidance of learning about violations.121 
Liability for the actions of a third party agent is not a re-
mote possibility.  The large majority of FCPA enforcement 
comes from actions of foreign third parties.122  This fact should 
put project sponsors and companies on guard to prevent prohib-
ited actions by local agents, consultants, and counsel.  While 
problems are difficult to foresee, a large amount of due dili-
gence can help project parties make smart decisions on local 
help.  A project sponsor will wisely select a local agent based on 
objective criteria such as the agent’s competence to accomplish 
the designed purpose of the agreement.123  The sponsor should 
perform an extensive verification on the local’s reputation 
based on business references, information from government or 
private institutions in the host country, interviews with the lo-
cal,124 and even through reports a special investigator can find 
out.125  One way to avoid liability is to not hire a local with a 
checkered past.  The parties should document these due dili-
gence efforts,126 which can help them show that they tried to 
learn of FCPA problems. 
The project sponsor can also take steps toward ensuring 
FCPA compliance through contractual representations, cove-
nants, and termination clauses.  The contract between the par-
ties can include a representation that establishes the local’s 
familiarity with the FCPA, which will teach the person about 
the importance of the FCPA and show that he or she knew 
about the law.127  Also, the contract can include a representa-
tion stating that none of the employees of the agent, consult-
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ant, or counsel is a government employee,128 which can exclude 
liability that would arise from any payments to a foreign offi-
cial.129 The agreement can also include covenants through 
which the local agrees to not perform any of the actions prohib-
ited by the FCPA.130 Another covenant that will help ensure 
compliance with the FCPA is a requirement that the local 
make all payments through check or legitimate electronic 
transfer from a bank.131  Specifically, the agreement can stipu-
late that the agreement is voided and terminated upon perfor-
mance of any action prohibited by the FCPA and that the pro-
ject sponsor does not have to pay.132  Furthermore, a contract 
can provide the project sponsor with a right of action to recu-
perate the funds that the agent or other local used in commit-
ting a prohibited act.133  Presenting these contractual obliga-
tions to a local can help measure the local’s willingness to 
comply with the FCPA; if the local refuses to sign, it could be a 
warning sign of FCPA danger.134  More importantly, these 
safeguards will help prevent FCPA liability based on actions of 
locals. 
Contractual agreements alone, however, are not enough to 
prevent liability.135  The project parties can seek additional pro-
tection through close monitoring and supervision of FCPA-
related actions; telling the local actor once is not enough, and 
continuous inspection of the local’s activities is essential.136  
Project sponsors should actively implement a compliance pro-
gram that will prevent FCPA violations, such as regularly 
scheduled training programs in the local language for agents 
and other local actors.137  When any of the project parties be-
comes aware of potential violations, it should conduct an exten-
sive investigation to identify violations, improve the effective-
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ness of the compliance program,138 and prepare for a DOJ in-
vestigation.139  A sponsor must pay attention to the warning 
signs, which could be family relationships between the local 
and foreign officials, a local’s insistence that he or she be paid 
in cash, requests by the local for false paperwork to be pro-
duced, or a general culture of bribery in the country.140  By per-
forming extensive due diligence on the potential agent’s repu-
tation and background, requiring contractual guarantees, and 
closely monitoring the agent’s work, a project sponsor can pro-
tect itself from FCPA liability arising from the actions of local 
agents, consultants, and lawyers. 
C. Choosing and Using a Project Vehicle  
An important decision the project sponsor makes is what 
form the project company will take on to carry out the pro-
ject.141  This decision will depend on factors that are specific to 
each project, including the desired ratio of debt and equity, tax 
and other laws of the country where the project will occur, how 
much control any of the parties wishes to exert on the project 
company, what the lender prefers, and so forth.142  Often, a 
parent company wants to be separated from the project in or-
der to avoid liability and tax complications, which often results 
in a special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”) created only for the pro-
ject.143  The project parties can thus remove risk unrelated to 
the project, but separateness in documentation and behavior 
should be visible in the contracting process for the SPV to re-
main its separate status.144  While a “single-purpose corporate 
subsidiary” is common due to its limited liability, the SPV can 
be another entity, such as a general partnership, limited part-
nership, limited liability company, joint venture, or a combina-
tion of vehicles.145  This project company is often incorporated 
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in the host country.146 
Because project parties can be responsible for a surprising 
amount of FCPA liability for the actions of SPVs, it is im-
portant to analyze this liability when the project sponsor 
chooses a vehicle.  After choosing a vehicle, project sponsors 
must understand how to use the SPV to minimize the possibil-
ity of liability.  An issuer, domestic concern, or “any person” 
can be liable for using some form of interstate commerce to 
make, promise, authorize, or offer a bribe to “any person” who 
he or she knows will use the item of value in furtherance of a 
prohibited action.147  More specifically, a parent (here the pro-
ject sponsor) can be liable for a foreign-incorporated subsidi-
ary’s (here the SPV’s) actions if it “in some way directs, author-
izes, or knowingly acquiesces in the prohibited conduct.”148  The 
DOJ must only establish that the parent had knowledge of the 
wrongdoing.149  A parent cannot use its subsidiary as an inter-
mediary for making bribes.150  The foreign-incorporated SPV 
itself is not subject to the FCPA,151 even if the parent is,152 un-
less it uses some form of interstate commerce to take a step to-
ward breaking the FCPA.153  The parent will not be subject to 
liability if the foreign subsidiary performs an FCPA-prohibited 
action without parent involvement or knowledge.154 
The level of control that the parent exerts on the subsidi-
ary can help establish knowledge because a controlling parent 
is more likely to know about violations.155  Some common law 
agency factors that can establish control are common directors 
or officers, payment by the parent of the subsidiary’s salaries, a 
high level of involvement in the subsidiary’s daily activities, ef-
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fective control of the subsidiary, whether the subsidiary only 
does business with the parent, and so forth.156  If the parent 
does not control the subsidiary, liability is not as likely but 
could be found if the parent has considerable influence in the 
subsidiary, representation on its board, or a significant finan-
cial stake and does not make efforts to prevent the actions.157  
The level of control a partner exerts is also an important 
aspect in determining liability based on the actions of joint ven-
tures, another type of vehicle that some projects use.  Where 
the joint venture majority partner is subject to the FCPA, lia-
bility could exist when another partner commits a prohibited 
action because the majority partner will be presumed to have 
had control over the venture.158  If the minority partner is an 
official in the host government or a government-owned entity, 
any payment could be considered improper, and liability exists 
depending on the majority partner’s knowledge.159  For any for-
eign partner that has already made an FCPA-prohibited action, 
a payment by the U.S. partner might be considered a reim-
bursement and liability could exist if the U.S. partner has the 
requisite knowledge.160  Where the minority partner is subject 
to the FCPA, it still can be liable for prohibited payments even 
though it does not exercise the same control as a majority part-
ner.161 
As is usually the case with FCPA liability, however, careful 
and extensive due diligence can protect parties as they use spe-
cial vehicles to complete a project.162  Controlling parents can 
train their subsidiaries on the FCPA, have them sign state-
ments of understanding that show the importance of compli-
ance, and give guidelines on keeping the FCPA in mind when 
hiring employees and using agents.163  A noncontrolling parent 
can also file a formal protest, make demands that the subsidi-
ary stop the action, document its opposition, and consider end-
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ing the relationship if the improper behavior does not cease.164  
For joint venture vehicles, the partners that are subject to the 
FCPA should review the contacts of the joint venture part-
ner.165  A wise joint venture partner will insert FCPA compli-
ance into the agreement and perform due diligence on the rep-
utation of the partner.166  Asking how funds are spent, 
inquiring about FCPA violations, and demanding access to the 
financial records of the partnership are useful forms of due dil-
igence to ensure that the partnership is complying and that 
there will be no liability.167  
Project sponsors should consider the FCPA as they choose 
a vehicle and be aware of what liability could arise from this 
relationship.  Subsidiaries and joint ventures can be particular-
ly problematic.  Regardless of what project vehicle is chosen, it 
is essential that vehicles know about the FCPA and comply 
with it to prevent liability for project sponsors. 
D. Liability from Other Project Parties’ Actions 
Because of the extensive potential for vicarious liability 
under the FCPA, one might wonder whether a project party 
can be liable for the actions of project parties other than the 
project company.  Can a commercial lender, for example, ever 
be liable for a local agent’s improper payment or would a pro-
ject sponsor be liable when the project operator pays a small 
bribe to have a government inspector look the other way?  One 
of the problems with answering these questions, and a prevail-
ing issue with FCPA compliance, is the lack of case law.168  The 
majority of parties that come under DOJ investigation based on 
the anti-bribery provisions plead guilty or settle.169  Thus, there 
is little case law, and even less in relation to project finance.  
Understanding how the DOJ enforces the FCPA, however, can 
help project participants understand how to avoid any prob-
lems that arise from the actions of others. 
The statute specifically prohibits committing a prohibited 
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action through a third party while knowing that the third party 
will perform the action.170  Thus, obviously, if a lender is tired 
of delays and tells a contractor or operator to pay a bribe, the 
lender will be liable, however unlikely this situation seems.  
Furthermore, a lender is unlikely to be liable for a bribe that a 
debtor makes because seems far enough removed from the sit-
uation to be considered a principal or employer.  A creditor can 
be considered a principal if there is enough control over the ac-
tions of the debtor,171 and control can be a factor in determining 
vicarious liability.172  It is nevertheless a stretch to hold the 
lender liable for FCPA violations without more control over the 
project.  
As mentioned above, a project sponsor can be liable for the 
actions of a special-purpose subsidiary or joint venture.173  Con-
cerning the actions of the contractor or operator, a sponsor 
could be liable for actions where the sponsor had some control 
over these parties.174  Similarly, a contractor can likely be held 
liable for the actions of the subcontractor.175  For the project 
sponsor or any project party to be liable for the actions of a con-
tractor, subcontractor, operator, or any other party will likely 
depend on the level of control and knowledge that the project 
sponsor had.  These situations seem different from the rela-
tionship between the project sponsor and the project company 
because the contractor and operator are not subsidiaries or 
partners of the sponsor.  Yet the project sponsor still might 
have some sort of control over these parties or knowledge as de-
fined by the FCPA and enforced by the DOJ.  Regardless of 
how probable or remote liability is for any of the project parties 
due to the actions of another party, the participants should 
protect themselves by making FCPA compliance a standard 
part of their contracts with each other.176  
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E. Working with the Host Government  
Project finance requires a great deal of negotiation with 
and approvals from foreign governments.  These requirements 
mean that parties to a project are often vulnerable to bribe so-
licitations, especially in countries where bribes are custom-
ary.177  Throughout the course of a project, contact with the 
host government will come in many forms.  A project will need 
to acquire licenses, authorizations, permits, and concessions.178  
These concessions include agreements that the government 
gives to the project company to “develop, construct, and operate 
the project,”179 building permits,180 and environmental permits 
for issues relating to waste water, electricity, oil, and air.181  
With environmental permits, and potentially with other areas, 
the regulations can come from the local, state or provincial, or 
federal government of the country.182  
Often, host governments will sponsor a bidding process to 
determine which contractor should be able to carry out the pro-
ject.183  Also, the project sponsor or company will negotiate let-
ters of intent,184 memoranda of understanding,185 concession 
agreements,186 implementation agreements,187 approval of po-
litical risk insurance,188 preliminary agreements on important 
items that the government can provide such as enhanced infra-
structure near the project,189 waivers of sovereign immuni-
ties,190 build-own-transfer agreements,191 and arbitration 
agreements.192  All of these negotiations that require collabora-
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tion with government officials increase the susceptibility of a 
party to the project to make an improper payment.  
Making payments to the government is unavoidable when 
acquiring approvals requires paying fees.  The FCPA allows 
payments for routine governmental actions, which include ser-
vices “ordinarily and commonly performed” by foreign offi-
cials.193  It is often difficult to tell, however, whether a payment 
that a government official requires is a normal fee or a bribe.  
Project parties can protect themselves by focusing on the words 
and guidance of the statute to compare the fee and action with 
those the government ordinarily performs.194  Furthermore, a 
party can protect itself by requiring that all payments to the 
government be approved by senior management or counsel be-
fore they happen.195  Also, it is wise to require that payments 
be made to legitimate bank accounts in the host country, not 
banks in third countries unless in exceptional circumstances.196  
This was one source of trouble for Baker Hughes in its FCPA 
investigation; a wholly owned subsidiary paid over $4 million 
to “Consulting Firm A” located on the Isle of Man at the re-
quest of Kazakhstan’s state oil company in return for no ser-
vices from “Consulting Firm A.”197  Furthermore, payments 
should never be made in cash or to third parties.198  
When a red flag arises here or in other FCPA-related pro-
ject situations, any issuer or domestic concern can ask the DOJ 
for an opinion on whether the prospective behavior is legal.199  
The transaction must be real and not hypothetical, and the re-
quest usually comes before the requesting party accepts the 
deal.200  The request must come from an issuer or domestic con-
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cern who is a party to the transaction,201 and the opinion is not 
applicable to anyone who is not a party in the opinion re-
quest.202  The request must be specific and include all of the in-
formation about the potential conduct that the DOJ needs to 
make an opinion, and the information must be accurate and 
truthful.203  The DOJ will respond to a complete request within 
thirty days of receipt and can initiate an investigation if it 
wants to.204  The written opinion signed by the Attorney Gen-
eral or a designee is a statement that the requesting party can 
rely on.205  Thirty days might seem like a long time when a deal 
is pending, but protection against liability is worth the wait.  
V. CONCLUSION  
As Stuart Deming says, “the purpose and language of the 
FCPA appear to be straightforward in nature . . . [yet] [i]ts 
scope and means of application can be complex and lead to 
dramatically unexpected results.”206  This reality is especially 
true in the project finance setting because of the number of 
parties and variety of relationships between themselves and 
with the host government.  While only a few of the risks are 
discussed here, the parties can use the same measures to pro-
tect themselves in any situation where FCPA liability is a pos-
sibility.  Contractual guarantees, due diligence, proper train-
ing, and closely monitoring activities are necessary activities 
that can help a project avoid FCPA violations and liability.  
Most importantly, taking these active steps helps create a “cul-
ture of compliance”207 within a project where a commandment 
that better avoids FCPA problems than “don’t get caught” ex-
ists: don’t make bribes. 
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